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Abstract
This paper revisits the relationship between money and long-run growth
when liquidity demand at the rm level is explicitly modelled. Through a
set of sensitivity analyses, I nd that this relationship could be positive,
negative, or display a hump shape depending on the size of average liquid-
ity demand and the level of nancial development. These results explain
why existing empirical studies report mixed ndings on the relationship.
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1 Introduction
The conventional opinion on the relationship between money and long-run
growth, in the empirical literature, is that high ination hurts the growth of
the economy. Correspondingly, in the theoritical literature, many papers have
modeled a negative long-run relationship between the rates of growth of money
and output. For example, to model this relationship, Paul Gomme (1991) uses
the cash in advance approach in an endogenous growth framework; while, Wen-
ya Chang (2002) set the real balance as an input into the production of human
capital.
I am grateful to Danyang Xie, Pengfei Wang and Jenny Xu for helpful suggestions and
comments.
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However, recently, there has been evidence supporting a positive relationship
between growth and ination when the ination rate is low. Ghosh and Phillips
(1998) suggests that ination and growth are positively correlated at very low
ination rates. This can be seen from Figure 1, which reproduces their Figure
2. Interestingly, this chart in fact suggests a hump-shaped relationship between
ination and output growth. Kremer, Bick and Nautz (2009) also reports the
signicant positive e¤ect of ination on growth in the industrialized countries,
when the ination rate is below some threshold level. However, there are few
theoretical papers modeling this type of positive relationship between ination
and growth, except Wang and Xie (2010) that stressed frictions in labor market
and Ploeg and Alogoskous (1994) and Paal and Smith (2000) that emphasized
the role of at moneyin OLG models.
From the point of view of rmsliquidity, this paper provides a microfoun-
dation of the liquidity channel at the rm level. Through this channel, the
positive relationship between money and output growth is possible, when the
rate of the growth of money is low. Higher money supply mitigates the liquid-
ity pressure in the economy, thus enhancing the probability of survival of the
production projects. In turn, it is possible to obtain a higher growth rate when
the ination tax is lower.
The methodology used in this paper follows the spirit of Aghion, Angeletos,
Banerjee, and Manova (2007) by introducing two types of projects: short-run
projects and long-run projects. The long-run projects face liquidity risk, which
has to be overcome by borrowing cash from outside. Given the existence of the
borrowing constraints, monetary growth is helpful for the survival of the long-
run projects. This constitutes the positive e¤ect that money has on growth
through the liquidity channel. On the other hand, monetary growth also im-
poses a traditional ination tax, which leads to higher consumption and lower
investment.
In a numerical example, our model yields a hump-shaped relationship be-
tween money growth and output growth. This is qualitatively consistent with
the nding of Ghosh and Phillips (1998) and with the report for the sample of
industrialized countries by Kremer, Bick and Nautz (2009). As the subsequent
sensitivity analysis shows, the negative relationship between monetary growth
and output growth in the high-ination region is robust; however, the positive
e¤ect of monetary growth depends on the average liquidity demand by rms
and the borrowing multipler. The former result matches most of the recent
evidence, such as Khan and Senhadji (2001), Burdekin, Denzau, Keil, Sitthiyot,
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and Willett (2004), and Kremer, Bick and Nautz (2009). The latter nding
suggests that the di¤erences in the distribution of the demand for liquidity by
rms and the degree of development of the nancial market might be a potential
explanation for the mixed reports on the relationship between ination rate and
growth in the low-ination region.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the model
structure and provides a microfoundation for the liquidity channel at the
rms level. Section 3 solves this model on the balanced growth path. Section
4 presents the basic result of a numerical experiment. Section 5 conducts the
sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
This section sets up an endogenous growth model with a liquidity channel
of the monetary transmission mechanism. The monetary economy consists of
rmsand households. The householdssector has the standard properties
found in the models in the literature on cash in advance (CIA) for consumption.
The main di¤erence occurs in the rms sector. Firms which own long-run
projects, face heterogeneous liquidity risks. This assumption introduces the
demand for cash by rms to overcome their liquidity problem. The liquidity
channelis modeled in this way, with more details to come.
2.1 The Firms
Time is asummed to be discrete in the model. There are two types of rms owned
by the households. One type runs the short-run project, which completes in one
period and produces goods; the other type runs the long-run project, which
needs two periods to complete and to yield an output. The goods produced by
these two projects are homogeneous. However, the long-run project has a pos-
itive externality that guarantees endogenous improvement of the productivity
level (This is described in subsection 2.1.3). This type of project also faces a
liquidity risk because of the longer maturity period.
2.1.1 Firms with Short-run Projects
There are an innite numeber of identical rms of this type, which are contin-
uously and evenly distributed among [0,1]. They rent capitals from the house-
holds and use the production technology given by AtT 1 t Kt ; to yield goods
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at the end of each period. Here, At is the exogenous technology, Tt is the en-
dogenous productivity level, and Kt is the capital stock used in the short-run
projects.
The objective function of this type of rms can be given by
maxSt = Pt(AtT 1 t Kt   rSt Kt);
where St is the prot of the rm at time t, r
S
t is the real rental rate of the
capital in short-run project. From the rst order condition, we can show that
AtT 1 t K 1t = rSt : (1)
This means that the marginal productivity of capital used in the short-run
project is just equal to the marginal cost, which is the short-run rental rate.
2.1.2 Firms with Long-run Projects
There are also an innite number of rms with long-run projects. Each of them
exists for only two periods. Thus, these rms can be divided into two types, the
younger and the older. At any period, both types overlap. When older rms
die, new ones come into existence, and younger ones become older. The total
number of each type of rms is constant. For convenience, I suppose that each
type of these rms are identical and continuously and evenly distributed among
[0,1].
Each rm operates only one long-run project. Each long-run project needs
one period to build and the other period to produce. Thus, at any period, there
are an innite number of identical long-run projects which are going to yield at
the end of the current period; and also, an innite number of identical long-run
projects which are just beginning their installation. A detailed time structure
about long-run projects is given in Figure 2.
New rms, owning long-run projects, rent capitial from households at the
beginning of the period when they are born. However, the older rms, which
have just nished the installation of their long-run capitals, have to face liquidity
risks, before their long-run projects can produce any goods. If the liquidity risk
of one long-run project is overcome, it will produce goods in next period; if not,
it will produce nothing. Irrespective of whether rms with long-run projects
produce or not, long-run capital will always depreciate. The rate of depreciation
is given by l:
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Liquidity Risks The liquidity risk in this paper is modeled following the
spirit of Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova (2007). Suppose that any
long-run project has to incur an additional cost in cash after the installation of
its long-run capital. This type of cost can be understood as the demand for cash
ow by the long-run projects. These additional costs are heterogenous among
the di¤erent long-run projects. After the end of the long-run projects, the cash
can be collected back by the rms.
Take rm i; which begins its long-run project at time t, as an example: At
the beginning of period t; rm i rents Zit units of capital from households and
builds its long-run project for the whole period of t. At the end of period t;
after nishing the installation, rm i has to pay a random nominal cost, Lit.
In this model, I suppose that the detrended real value of this additional cost,
lit  L
i
t
PtTt ; follows a lognormal distribution, whose the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) is given by
F (l) =
1
2
[1 + erf(
ln l   l
l
p
2
)];
and the probability density function (pdf) is
f(l) =
1
ll
p
2
e
  (ln l l)2
22
l :
Here, erf() is the error function, l and l are the mean and standard deviation
of ln l:
If rm i can borrow enough cash to pay o¤ its nominal additional cost,
then it can run its long-run project in next period and will produce goods by
the production technology of At+1T 1 t (Zit) . If this rm cannot pay o¤ its
additional cost, its long-run project will fail and it will produce nothing. At
the end of rm is second period, irrespective of whether its long-run project
succeeds or fails, the money borrowed from outside is still in this project and
can be taken back.
Credit Constraint The credit problem exists in this economy. Each borrower
faces a credit constraint and cannot borrow an amount of money that is beyond
(< 1) fraction of his evaluated income. Here, the borrowing multiplier, ;
should be interpreted as the loan to value ratio. In the view of lenders, the
expected value of the long-run project is equal to its evaluated income, since
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there is the requirement of paying o¤ the debt rst.
Suppose that the lenders are not capable of di¤erentiating between the
heterogenous additional costs in the di¤erent long-run projects. They have
to use the average survival probability Pt+1 for the whole industry of long-
run projects to evaluate the survival possibility of any single long-run project.
Thus, the evaluated income of rm i; which owns a long-run project, is given
by Pt+1Pt+1At+1T 1 t (Zit) ; where Pt+1 is the price of goods at time t + 1.
Therefore, the upper limit of money that rm i can borrow, is
Dit+1  Pt+1Pt+1At+1T 1 t (Zit) : (2)
Optimal Choice of Long-run Firm In this subsection, I still use the ex-
ample of rm i; which is born at time t. A detailed description for the optimal
choice of this rm is given as below.
Since each rm of long-run project exists for only two periods, its optimal
question can be solved backwards. At its second period, rm i makes decisions
on whether to borrow money against its liquidity risk, and how much money
is needed. Given its optimal strategy in the second period, rm i makes the
decision on renting capital at its rst period.
To Borrow or Not Borrow Money At the last period of rm i (time
t + 1), its nominal additional cost Lit is already known. The problem faced by
this rm, is whether to borrow money and how much to borrow.
At rst, I need to know how much money this rm volunteers to borrow,
when no credit constraint exists.
If rm i does not borrow against its liquidity risk, the value of its long-run
project is given by
V Nt+1 =  Pt+1rLt Zit ;
where rLt is the real long-run rental at time t. When this rm borrows enough
money, the value of its long project can be written as
V Bt+1 = Pt+1At+1T
1 
t (Z
i
t)
  Rt+1Lit   Pt+1rLt Zit ;
where Rt+1 is the nominal interest rate at time t + 1: Since borrowers have to
pay o¤ interest, they would not like to borrow more (or less) money than the
amount actually needed. For rm i to have an incentive to borrow from outside,
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it is needed that
V Bt+1  V Nt+1:
From above inequation, we can nd that the maximum amount of money that
rm i volunteers to borrow is
Lit =
Pt+1At+1T 1 t (Zit)
Rt+1
: (3)
In this economy, the borrowing multiplier, ; is less than 1 and the average
surviving probability, Pt+1; is also not larger than 1: At the same time, generally,
an appropriate nominal interest rate Rt+1 must be less than 1. So, the upper
limit of money that rm i can borrow, should be much less than the maximum
amount of money that rm i volunteers to borrow, i.e.,
Dit+1 <<
Lit:
Therefore, at this stage (time t + 1), the optimal strategy for rm i; which
faces an additional cost, Lit; is: to borrow zero unit of money, when this addi-
tional cost is higher than the upper limit that it can borrow, Dit+1; to borrow
Lit units of money, when L
i
t is not larger than D
i
t+1:
To Rent Capital At its rst period (time t), rm i makes the choice on
how much capital it should rent. Given its optimal strategy at time t+ 1, rm
i maximizes its expected prot, EtLt+1(i); that is,
EtPt+1
Z Dit+1
PtTt
0
At+1T 1 t (Zit)f(l)dl
 EtRt+1
Z Dit+1
PtTt
0
PtTtl  f(l)dl   EtPt+1rLt Zit :
Here, additional cost, Lit; can be taken as a state, and the expected survival
probability of long-run project, EtPit+1, depends on the realization of Lit. As
Figure 3 illustrates, the probability that additional cost, Lit; is not larger than
the upper limit of borrowing, Dit+1; is equal to the survival probability of this
long-run project.
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Above objective function can be rewritten as
EtfPit+1Pt+1At+1T 1 t (Zit)
 Rt+1PtTt
Z Dit+1
PtTt
0
lf(l)dl   Pt+1rLt Zitg;
where
Pit+1 
1
2
+
1
2
erf(
ln
Dit+1
PtTt   l
l
p
2
): (4)
Given the complexity of this prot function, the parameters restrictions
needed to garantee its concavity, are not easily obtained. However, I argue
that in this modeled economy, the expected nominal interest rate is controlled
to be much lower than 1. In such a monetary environment, a su¢ cient condition
for strict concavity of this objective function can be given by
l < lnA(1 + g
M )  
2
l
(1  )
(see more details in Appendix 6.1).
Thus, the rst order condition of above optimality problem is given as below.
Zit : Et[
1
2
+
1
2
erf(
ln
Pt+1Pt+1At+1T 1 t (Zit)
PtTt   l
l
p
2
)]At+1T 1 t (Zit) 1
+

l
p
2
Ete
 [
ln
Pt+1Pt+1At+1T 1 t (Z
i
t)

PtTt  l
l
p
2
]2
At+1T 1 t (Zit) 1 (5)
  
l
p
2
EtRt+1Pt+1e
 
[ln
Pt+1Pt+1At+1T 1 t (Z
i
t)

PtTt  l]
2
22
l At+1T 1 t (Zit) 1
= rLt
It is necessary to mention that the marginal e¤ect of long-run capital is com-
posed of the marginal increments of both the expected sales amount and the
expected cost of interest. This is because an increment of long-run capital
increases not only the survival probability of the long-run project and input
factors, but also the expected debt.
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2.1.3 Endogenous Productivity
Long-run projects not only produce goods, but also have the positive external-
ity of improving the endogenous productivity level. Following the traditional
method in the literature on endogenous growth, I also assume that the evolve-
ment of endogenous productivity follows the rule given as below.
Tt+1 =
Z 1
0
nit+1T 1 t (Zit)di;
where nit+1 is an indicator variable, such that n
i
t+1 = 1; when rm is long-run
project survives; and nit+1 = 0; otherwise.
Since each type of rms with long-run projects are identical and independent,
based on the law of large numbers, there are Pt+1 = 12+ 12 erf(
ln
Dt+1
PtTt  l
l
p
2
) fraction
of long-term projects that can survive at time t + 1. Therefore, the process of
endogenous productivity can be rewritten as
Tt+1 = Pt+1T 1 t (Zt) : (6)
2.2 Households
The households sector is treated in the standard way. There are an innite
number of independent and identical households. The representive household
faces the cash in advance constraint on consumption (8) besides the budget
constraint (7). Thus, its optimality question can be given by
max
1X
t=0
t
C1 t
1  
s.t.:
PtCt + Pt[Kt+1   (1  )Kt + Zt+1   (1  L)Zt 1] +Dt+1 +Mt+1(7)
= Pt(r
S
t Kt + r
L
t 1Zt 1) + (1 +Rt)Dt +Mt +Xt +
S
t +
Z 1
0
Lt (j)dj;
PtCt Mt +Xt; (8)
where Ct denotes the consumption at time t, Dt+1 is the amount of money
that is lent to rms with long-run projects, Mt+1 is the amount of money that
the household holds at the end of time t, and Xt is the money ejection at the
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beginning of time t.
The rst order conditions can be obtained as follows,
Ct : C
 
t = 1;tPt + 2;tPt; (9)
Dt+1 : 1;t = Et1;t+1(1 +Rt+1); (10)
Mt+1 : 1;t = Et(1;t+1 + 2;t+1); (11)
Kt+1 : Pt1;t = EtPt+11;t+1[r
S
t+1 + (1  )]; (12)
Zt+1 : Pt1;t = 
2EtPt+21;t+2[(1  l) + rLt+1]: (13)
Here, 1;t and 2;t are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the budget
constraint and the cash in advance constraint, respectively.
2.3 Market Clearing
The goods market clearing condition can be easily written as
Ct +Kt+1   (1  )Kt + Zt+1   (1  l)Zt 1 (14)
= AtT 1 t Kt + PtAtT 1 t 1 Zt 1  Yt;
where Yt is the gross output at time t. Given the timing of money ejection, the
money market clearing condition is given as
Dt+1 +Mt+1 = Dt +Mt +Xt; (15)
where Mt is the money held by households and Dt is the money left in long-run
projects. Thus, the money growth rate can be written as
gMt+1 =
Dt+1 +Mt+1
Dt +Mt
  1:
2.4 Balanced Growth Path
Suppose the exogenous technology level is always the constant, A. On the
balanced growth path, ct  CtTt ; kt  KtTt ; zt  ZtTt ; 1 + t+1 
Pt+1
Pt
; 1 + gTt+1 
Tt+1
Tt ; Pt, Rt and gMt+1 are all constants.
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The equation system on the balanced growth path is summarized as follows.
The derivation details can be obtained in Appendix 6.2.
From the binding cash in advance constraint on consumption, we can obtain
that
(1 + gM ) = (1 + )(1 + gT ):
This long-run relationship still holds even if this CIA constraint does not exists
at all. This result implies that the CIA only on consumptionchannel in the
monetary transmission mechanism has no real e¤ect in the long-run. This is
consistent with the usual conclusion in the relevant literature.
By the intertemporal substitution condition of households, we know that
[
1 + 
(1 +R)
] 
1
 = 1 + gT :
Together with the denitions of real short-run rental and real long-run rental,
we obtain following two equations respectively.
(1 + gT ) = [Ak 1 + (1  )];
(1 + gT )2 = 2f(1  L) + rLg;
where
rL  f[ 1
2
+
1
2
erf(
ln(A(1 + gM ))  l
l
p
2
)]
+

l
p
2
e
  [ln(A(1+gM )) l]2
22
l (1  RP)gAz 1:
From the evolvement process of endogenous technology, we obtain that
1 + gT = Pz ; (16)
where the survival probability is given as
P = 1
2
+
1
2
erf(
ln(A(1 + gM ))  l
l
p
2
): (17)
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3 Model Simulations
This section presents simulated long-run relationships of above monetary econ-
omy by a numerical experiment on the balance growth path.
3.1 Model Parameterization
I set the technology level A as 1: The elasticity of intertemporal substitution
of households is chosen to be 1=2: This means that the value of parameter 
is 2. The discount factor  is set as 0.96. The capital shares in the short-run
production function and in the long-run production function,  and ; are both
set as 0.3. The depreciation rate of short-run capital, ; is 0.1. These parameter
values are often adopted in business cycle literature. The depreciation rate of
long-run capital, L; is set to be equal to 1 (1 )2: As in the relevent literature,
the borrowing multiplier  is given by 0.77.
In the baseline numerical experiment, the parameters in the distribution
function of additional cost are chosen in following way. As we know, the variance
of logarithm of additional cost 2l ; must not be negative; and   Rt+1Pt+1
should be less than 1 when there is no hyperination. Given the special para-
meters restriction of
l < lnA(1 + g
M )  
2
l
(1  ) ;
l should at least be less than lnA(1+g
M ): In order to analyze the implications
of money growth, the minimum value of the rate of money growth, gM ; should
be 0. Under above parameterization, we nd that lnA = ln 0:77 =  0:261 36:
Thus, I set the mean of logarithm of additional cost, l; as  0:3: From above
parameter restriction, we also obtain that
2l < (1  )[lnA(1 + gM )  l]:
In order not to violate this restriction, I set the standard deviation of the loga-
rithm of additional cost, l; as 17:8 :
3.2 E¤ects of the Growth of Money
The long-run e¤ects of the rate of money growth are presented in Figure 4.
As the top left diagram, whose longitudinal coordinate is labelled by Growth
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Rateshows, with the increase in the rate of money growth, the long-run growth
rate rst increases from 1%, and approaches its peak at 4%, when the rate of
money growth is at 10%. It then begins to decrease. Obviously, 10% is the
threshold level of the rate of money growth. Above this threshold level, the
pace of decline in the growth rate also changes very fast. This pace of decline
is much larger in the region of money growth rate between 10% and 40% than
in the area where the money growth rate is above 40%. This hump-shaped
relationship between output growth and money growth illustrates that modest
growth in money supply is good for economic growth; but, excessive money
supply hurts growth.
Similarly, a hump-shaped relationship between the rate of real return and
money growth can also be generated by this model. It is presented by the
rst diagram in the second line, whose longitudinal coordinate is labelled by
Real Return of D. The peak of this real return is also approached, when the
monetary growth rate is 10%.
As the right-most diagram in the second line shows, there is an almost one-
to-one relationship between the ination rate and the rate of money growth.
So, it is appropriate to say that the long-run relationship between the growth
and the ination rate is very similar to that between output growth and money
growth, which is shown in the top left diagram. This hump-shaped relationship
is qualitatively consistent with the general conclusion in recent empirical reports,
such as Ghosh and Phillips (1998) and the studies on industrialized countries by
Kremer, Bick and Nautz (2009). In addition, the long-run relationship between
investment and ination should also be similar to what is presented in the top
right diagram, whose longitudinal coordinate is labelled by Investment. This
negative correlation is consistent with the nding by Barro (1995).
The reasons behind these results can be given from the point of view of the
nancial market equilibrium.
It is clear that the upper limit of borrowing, D; is generally less than the
upper bar of oating debt that rms volunteer to borrow, L: Given the distribu-
tion of additional cost in long-run projects, we can easily see that there is always
a shortage of liquidity in rm sector. However, the supply of loan for cash, D;
is determined by the ination rate. When the rate of money growth is small,
ination rate is also low. Households have not much incentive to provide cash
for loan. However, by equation (17), the increment of the money growth rate
would increase the average survival probability of the long-run projects. In turn,
this stimulates output and raises the upper limit of borrowing, D; as shown by
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equation of (2). Thus, there is extra demand in the loan market. This pro-
motes the nominal interest rate much higher than the ination rate. Therefore,
the real return on nominal debt, D; has to go up. Contrary to Tobins e¤ect,
households would decrease their investment and increase nominal debt supply.
Moreover, when the ination tax is low, the positive e¤ect of money supply
on output growth, which is through mitigating liquidity pressure, dominates the
negative e¤ect from ination. Therefore, we see a positive relationship between
money and growth in the low-ination region.
However, when money growth rate is higher than the threshold level of 10%,
the ination rate becomes high enough to stimulate the supply of cash for loan.
Given the high level of nominal interest rate, the cost of borrowing is much
higher. However, the survival probability is already high enough. The marginal
benet to increase survival rate of long-run projects further is low. Thus, the
incentive to borrow cash decreases, leading to oversupply in the loan market.
The real return of loan would be depressed. Correspondingly, the short-run
investment goes up. But, due to the lower increment of the survival rate and
the higher loan cost, the long-run investment still goes down and overwhelms
the increase in short-run investment. Thus, the long-run capital level always
decreases with the increasing rate of money growth, as shown by the diagram,
whose longitudinal coordinate is labelled by Long-run Capital in Figure 4.
So does investment. Even if money growth is still helpful for the survival rate
of long-run projects (as shown by the diagram whose longitudinal coordinate
is labelled by Surviving Probability), its positive e¤ect on output is already
much weaker in the high-ination region. However, the negative impact of
ination tax is much stronger, leading to a negative relationship between
output growth and money growth when the ination rate is high.
4 Sensitivity Analysis
As reported above, the results of the baseline experiment depend on the dis-
tribution of additional cost in the long-run projects and the credit constraint.
In this section, I will analyze the sensitivity of the relationship between output
growth and money growth to the mean of logarithm of additional costs, l; and
the borrowing multiplier  in the credit constraint. The e¤ects of the cash in
advance constraint on investment are also checked.
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4.1 Mean of Logarithm of Additional Costs
4.1.1 Exogenous l
Suppose that the mean of the logarithm of additional costs is set exogenously. To
an xed standard deviation l; a smaller l
1 means less expected additional cost.
Thus, the extra demand of loan is less and the survival probability is higher for
any xed rate of money growth. Since 1 is the natual upper limit of the survival
probability, the marginal positive e¤ect of money growth to survival probability
is lower. Therefore, as presented by Figure 5, the hump-shaped relationship
between growth rate and money growth disappears with the decrease of l:
4.1.2 Endogenous l
Compared to the exogenous mean of the logarithm of additional costs, an en-
dogenous mean is more meaningful. It is also more acceptable if the endogenous
mean is a strictly increasing function of the detrand long-run capital level, ZtTt .
Suppose the form of function l(
Zt
Tt ); is given by
ln(e(
Zt
Tt )
);
where  is a constant calibrated by -0.3, the value of parameter  is non-negative:
The equation systems on the balanced growth path becomes to following.
1 + gT = Pz
[
1 + 
(1 +R)
] 
1
 = 1 + gT
(1 + gT ) = [Ak 1 + (1  )]
(1 + gT )2 = 2[rl + (1  l)]
P = 1
2
+
1
2
erf(
lnPA(1 + ) + (   ) ln z   
l
p
2
)
1Given the parameterization in this model, too low a value of l will volates the parameter
constraint on concavity of the expected prot of long-run rms.
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[ P +       RP
l
p
2
e
  [lnPA(1+)+( ) ln z ]2
22
l ]Az 1
  Rp
23l (1 + )z
Z P(1+)Az
0
e
  [ln l ln(ez)]2
22
l  [ln l   ln(ez)]dl
= rl
When the value of  is set as 0; this equation systems reverts to the original
form and  corresponds to the exogenous l:When  is positive and small enough
to satisfy the parameter restriction on concavity, the hump-shaped relationship
between growth and money can still be obtained. The upper diagram with the
title of eta=-0.3 in Figure 6 gives this basic result. Now, let us focus on the
region where the money growth rate is below the threshold level. With the
increasing value of , the positive marginal e¤ect of money growth to output
growth becomes stronger. However, when I allow the value of  to be changed,
this marginal e¤ect disappears with the decrease of : The reason is similar to
that in the case of exogenous l. Take the case of  calibrated by 0.01 as an
example. Its qualitative property is illustrated by the lower diagram whose title
is theta=0.01in Figure 6.
4.2 Credit Constraint
If the value of borrowing multiplier  becomes higher2 , which indicates a more
developed nancial market, then the maximum amount of loan borrowed by
rms with long-run projects will increase, given a xed long-run capital level.
This implies that the development of the nancial market can facilitate the
mitigation of the liquidity problem. Similar to the case of exogenous l; the
marginal e¤ect of money growth to survival probability also decreases with the
increase of . As Figure 7 illustrates, the marginal e¤ects of money growth rate
to output growth, in the area where money growth is below the threshold level,
also disappear with the increase of :
4.3 CIA on Investment
Suppose that the requirement of cash in advance is not only for consumption
but also for  fraction of investment. Thus, the new cash in advance constraint
2Given the parameterization in this model, a sensitivity analysis on decreasing  is impos-
silbe. Because lower value of  will violates the parameter restriction on concavity of expected
prot function of rms who own long-run projects.
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can be written as follows,
PtfCt +  [Kt+1   (1  )Kt + Zt+1   (1  l)Zt 1]g Mt +Xt:
When  = 0; this constraint is back to original form; while, when  = 1; it be-
comes CIA on both consumption and investment. As Stockman (1981) argued,
CIA on investment will introduce the e¤ect of ination taxon investment.
Figure 8 presents the basic implications of money growth when  = 1:
The result is very similar to that in the case of CIA on consumption except
that the current investment is lower. This is because the constraint of CIA
on investment enhances the ination tax. With the increasing ination rate,
more money is lent to long-run projects but not held for investment in the
next period. However, the stable hump-shaped relationship between growth
and money veries that this basic result is robust whether or not the cash in
advance constraint on investment exists.
5 Conclusion
From above numerical experiments, we nd that the relationship between output
growth and money growth depends on the distribution of additional costs in
long-run projects and the value of the borrowing multiplier, which indicates the
degree of development of the nancial market. This relationship is still robust
when the cash in advance constraint on investment is introduced. However,
with the decrease of additional cost for liquidity in rms, el , or, the increase
of the borrowing multipler, , the positive marginal e¤ect of money growth (or,
ination) to output growth disappears. But, the negative relationship between
money growth and output growth, in the region of high-ination, is very robust.
Given the controversial empirical reports on this relationship in the region
of low-ination, this paper suggests that the di¤erences in liquidity demand
and the development of the nancial market among individual samples might
be a potential explanation. Thus, empirical research incorporating the aver-
age requirment for liquidity at the rm level and the borrowing multipler as
independent variables, should be the direction of future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Concavity of the Expected Prot of Firm i
In this appendix, I check the conditions for the strict concavity of the objective
function of rm i who runs a long-run project: Given the objective function as
follows,
Et
L
t+1(i) = Et[
1
2
+
1
2
erf(
ln
Pt+1Pt+1At+1T 1 t (Zit)
PtTt   l
l
p
2
)]Pt+1At+1T 1 t (Zit)
 EtRt+1PtTt
Z Pt+1Pt+1At+1T 1 t (Zit)
PtTt
0
xf(x)dx  EtPt+1rltZit ;
we can easily obtain the rst derivative to Zit :
@Et
L
t+1(i)
@Zit
= fEt[ 1
2
+
1
2
erf(
ln(Zit)
   l
l
p
2
)]
+
1
l
p
2
Ete
 [ ln(Z
i
t)
 l
l
p
2
]2
(1  Et)g{(Zit) 1
 Pt+1rlt;
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where   Pt+1Pt+1At+1T 1 tPtTt > 0;{  Pt+1At+1T
1 
t > 0;  Rt+1Pt+1; and
the second derivative to Zit :
@2Et
L
t+1(i)
@(Zit)
2
= Et[
1
2
+
1
2
erf(
ln(Zit)
   l
l
p
2
)](   1){(Zit) 2
+
1
l
p
2
Ete
 [ ln(Z
i
t)
 l
l
p
2
]2
(1  Et)(   1){(Zit) 2
+{(Zit) 1[1 
(1  Et)(ln(Zit)   l)
2l
]
1p

Ete
 [ ln(Z
i
t)
 l
l
p
2
]2 p
2lZit
= {(Zit) 2fEt(   1)[
1
2
+
1
2
erf(
ln(Zit)
   l
l
p
2
)]
+
1
l
p
2
Ete
 [ ln(Z
i
t)
 l
l
p
2
]2
(1  Et)(   1)
+

l
p
2
Ete
 [ ln(Z
i
t)
 l
l
p
2
]2
(1  (1  Et)(ln(Z
i
t)
   l)
2l
)g
Thus, the su¢ cient and necessary condition for strict concavity of Etlt+1(i) is
Et(   1)[1
2
+
1
2
erf(
ln(Zit)
   l
l
p
2
)]
+
1
l
p
2
Ete
 [ ln(Z
i
t)
 l
l
p
2
]2
(1  Et)(   1)
+
1
l
p
2
Ete
 [ ln(Z
i
t)
 l
l
p
2
]2
(1  (1  Et)(ln(Z
i
t)
   l)
2l
)
< 0
In the usual monetary situation, EtRt+1 < 1, thus Et < 1: Given  < 1;
we can easily nd that the rst two terms are both negative. Since the economy
in this model is supposed to be around the balanced growth path, together with
the fact that on the balanced growth path
(Zit)
 = A(1 + gM );
the condition
1 <
(1  Et)(lnA(1 + gM )  l)
2l
can guarantee the third term to be negative.
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Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for concavity of Etlt+1(i) is
l < lnA(1 + g
M )  
2
l
(1  ) : (18)
This gives a constraint for the choice of parameters of the liquidity cost distri-
bution.
6.2 Derivation of Equations on the BGP
From equation (10) and equation (11), we nd that
Et(1;t+1Rt+1) = Et(2;t+1) (19)
with the rewritten form of equation (10)
Et1;t+1
1;t
=
1
(1 +Rt+1)
6= 0 (20)
we know that the value of 1 will never be zero. Similarly for 2: Thus, at the
balanced growth path, the CIA constraint is always binding:
PtCt =Mt +Xt
together with the market clearing condition, we nd that
PtCt +Dt = Dt+1 +Mt+1
Thus,
1 + gMt+1 
Dt+1 +Mt+1
Dt +Mt
=
PtCt +Dt
Pt 1Ct 1 +Dt 1
Since at balanced growth path,
Ct
Ct 1
= 1 + gYt 
Yt
Yt 1
=
At(
Tt
Tt 1 k

t + Ptzt 1)
At 1(kt 1 +
Pt 1zt 2
Tt 1=Tt 2 )
Thus,
gY = gT
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Given
Dt+1 = PtTt
Z Pt+1Pt+1At+1T 1 t (Zt)
PtTt
0
lf(l)dl
we can nd that at BGP,
1 + gDt+1 
Dt+1
Dt
=
PtTt
R Pt+1Pt+1At+1T 1 t (Zt)
PtTt
0 lf(l)dl
Pt 1Tt 1
R PtPtAtT 1 t 1 (Zt 1)Pt 1Tt 1
0 lf(l)dl
:
This implies that
1 + gD = (1 + )(1 + gT ):
Therefore,
1 + gM = (1 + )(1 + gT ): (21)
When there is no cash in advance constraint on consumption, the money market
clearing condition implies that the growth rate of debt for cash gD is equal to
the growth rate of money supply gM : Thus, the equation (21) still holds in the
case of no CIA.
From equation (9), we nd that
Et
C t+2
C t+1
= Et
(1;t+2 + 2;t+2)Pt+2
(1;t+1 + 2;t+1)Pt+1
Together with equation (11) and (20), we obtain that
Et
C t+2
C t+1
= Et
1 + t+2
(1 +Rt+1)
:
Thus,
1 + gC  Ct+1
Ct
= [
1 + 
(1 +R)
] 
1
 = 1 + gT (22)
From equation (9), we also nd that
EtC
 
t+1 = Et(1;t+1 + 2;t+1)Pt+1
together with equation (19), we obtain that
Et1;t+1Pt+1 = Et
C t+1
1 +Rt+1
:
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At the balanced growth path, together with equation (1), (5) and equation
(6), equation (12) and (13) can be rewritten as
(1 + gT ) = [Ak 1 + (1  )] (23)
(1 + gT )2 = 2f(1  L) + rLg (24)
where rL  Az 1f[ 12+ 12 erf( ln[A(1+)(1+g
T )] l
l
p
2
)]+ 
l
p
2
e
  (ln[A(1+)(1+gT )] l)2
22
l (1 
RP)g: And by the equation (6), we obtain that
1 + gTt+1 
Tt+1
Tt = Pt+1zt
 :
)
1 + gT = Pz (25)
where
P = 1
2
+
1
2
erf(
ln[A(1 + )(1 + gT )]  l
l
p
2
) (26)
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 Figure 4 Long-Run Effects of Money Growth 
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 Figure 8 Effects of Money Growth with CIA Constraint on Investment 
